Final report of the group of experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Behalal, Zobel et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2017
Final report of the group of experts on the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
Behalal, Zobel; Sollazzo, Roberto; Vogel, Christoph; Zounmenou, David
Abstract: The most significant event for the Group of Experts during the current mandate was the
assassination of two of its members, Michael Sharp, Coordinator and armed groups expert, and Zaida
Catalán, humanitarian expert. This unprecedented event constitutes a deliberate attack against the
Security Council and impacted the Group’s ability to fully implement its fieldwork agenda for the present
report. More broadly, this also speaks to the concerning security situation prevailing in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo: while the Kasais have witnessed a stark escalation of violence, other areas remain
affected by chronic levels of insecurity. Since its last report, the Group noted fewer cases of election-
related violence across the country, notwithstanding several cases of interference by armed groups in
voter registration. Armed groups, such as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR),
the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie, the Allied Democratic Forces and the Forces
républicaines du Burundi continue to represent threats to peace and security in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. However, there is a changing dynamic of conflict and armed mobilization in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, reflected by the previously reported shift towards a further fragmentation of armed
groups operating in a more decentralized while heavily networked manner. In this context, foreign and
local armed groups are increasingly interconnected, which also impacts on the patterns of violence. These
linkages can be partially explained by the fact that foreign armed groups have evolved over time and
have begun to feature Congolese nationals in their ranks, sometimes even in leadership positions. The
Group also documented instances of collaboration between elements of the Forces armées de la République
démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and armed groups. Concerning natural resources, the implementation
of mineral traceability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has considerably reduced instances
of armed groups directly benefiting from the exploitation and trade of tin, tantalum and tungsten. In
addition, opportunities for indirect benefits from such minerals are decreasing. The Group found that the
ITRI Ltd Tin Supply Chain initiative traceability system — while well intentioned and designed — has
shortcomings in its implementation, enabling different actors to intentionally or inadvertently facilitate
smuggling. The Group also documented several breaches of the chain of custody for mineral trade in
North Kivu Province as well as the ongoing sale of tags on the black market in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The gold sector continues to suffer from the lack of a traceability system. Consequently,
artisanally sourced gold from conflict-affected areas can still be exported to international markets through
smuggling, involving illicit financial flows. The Group also found that a senior FARDC officer is involved
in gold exploitation. In addition, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates are
being used in a fraudulent manner to export gold to Dubai, the main recipient of artisanally sourced gold
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kampala remains the main transit hub for gold smuggled
out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group found that rules and procedures could be
improved to allow airlines and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as transit and recipient
countries to more efficiently tackle smuggling by way of hand-carry gold. The Group observed violations
of the arms embargo, both within the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as in the frame of cross-
border dynamics. A network of Congolese and Burundian nationals, including elements of the Forces
de défense nationale (FDN) of Burundi, was involved in arms trafficking in Uvira, South Kivu Province.
The Group documented further violations of the arms embargo involving FDN and FDLR.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-145405
Published Version
Originally published at:
Behalal, Zobel; Sollazzo, Roberto; Vogel, Christoph; Zounmenou, David (2017). Final report of the group
of experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. New York: United Nations.
2
 United Nations  S/2017/672 
  
Security Council  Distr.: General 
10 August 2017 
 
Original: English 
 
17-11025 (E)    110817     
*1711025*   
  Letter dated 4 August 2017 from the Group of Experts extended 
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2293 (2016) addressed to 
the President of the Security Council 
 
 
 The members of the Group of Experts established pursuant to Security Council 
resolution 2293 (2016) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 2360 (2017), the final report on their 
work. 
 The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) on 30 June 2016 and was considered by the 
Committee on 21 July 2016. 
 The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were bro ught 
to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of 
the Council. 
 
 
(Signed) Zobel Behalal 
Acting Coordinator 
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2293 (2016) 
(Signed) Roberto Sollazzo 
Expert 
(Signed) Christoph Vogel 
Expert 
(Signed) David Zounmenou 
Expert 
  
S/2017/672 
 
 
17-11025 2/111 
 
  Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo  
 
 
 
 Summary 
 The most significant event for the Group of Experts during the current mandate 
was the assassination of two of its members, Michael Sharp, Coordinator and armed 
groups expert, and Zaida Catalán, humanitarian expert. This unprecedented event 
constitutes a deliberate attack against the Security Council and impacted the Group’s 
ability to fully implement its fieldwork agenda for the present report. More broadly, 
this also speaks to the concerning security situation prevailing in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo: while the Kasais have witnessed a stark escalation of 
violence, other areas remain affected by chronic levels of insecurity.  
 Since its last report, the Group noted fewer cases of election-related violence 
across the country, notwithstanding several cases of interference by armed groups in 
voter registration.  
 Armed groups, such as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR), the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie, the Allied 
Democratic Forces and the Forces républicaines du Burundi continue to represent 
threats to peace and security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, 
there is a changing dynamic of conflict and armed mobilization in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, reflected by the previously reported shift towards a further 
fragmentation of armed groups operating in a more decentralized while heavily 
networked manner.  
 In this context, foreign and local armed groups are increasingly interconnected, 
which also impacts on the patterns of violence. These linkages can be partially 
explained by the fact that foreign armed groups have evolved over time and have 
begun to feature Congolese nationals in their ranks, sometimes even in leadership 
positions. The Group also documented instances of collaboration between elements 
of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and armed 
groups.  
 Concerning natural resources, the implementation of mineral traceability in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo has considerably reduced instances of armed 
groups directly benefiting from the exploitation and trade of tin, tantalum and 
tungsten. In addition, opportunities for indirect benefits from such minerals are 
decreasing. The Group found that the ITRI Ltd Tin Supply Chain initiative 
traceability system — while well intentioned and designed — has shortcomings in its 
implementation, enabling different actors to intentionally or inadvertently facilitate 
smuggling. The Group also documented several breaches of the chain of custody for 
mineral trade in North Kivu Province as well as the ongoing sale of tags on the black 
market in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
 The gold sector continues to suffer from the lack of a traceability system. 
Consequently, artisanally sourced gold from conflict-affected areas can still be 
exported to international markets through smuggling, involving illicit financial 
flows. The Group also found that a senior FARDC officer is involved in gold 
exploitation. In addition, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
certificates are being used in a fraudulent manner to export gold to Dubai, the main 
recipient of artisanally sourced gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Kampala remains the main transit hub for gold smuggled out of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. The Group found that rules and procedures could be 
improved to allow airlines and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as 
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transit and recipient countries to more efficiently tackle smuggling by way of hand -
carry gold.  
 The Group observed violations of the arms embargo, both within the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as in the frame of cross -border dynamics. 
A network of Congolese and Burundian nationals, including elements of the Forces 
de défense nationale (FDN) of Burundi, was involved in arms trafficking in Uvira, 
South Kivu Province. The Group documented further violations of the arms embargo 
involving FDN and FDLR.  
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 I. Introduction  
 
 
1. This final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo is being submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 
2293 (2016). The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 
1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, after consultations 
following the tragic murder of two members of the Group of Experts, wrote to the 
Security Council noting the need to extend by a period of two months the deadline 
stipulated in resolution 2293 (2016) for the submission of this report to the Security 
Council. Subsequently, in resolution 2360 (2017), the Security Council extended the 
deadline for the submission of the report to 15 August 2017.  
2. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), as 
reiterated in paragraph 8 of resolution 2360 (2017), the Group continued to 
exchange information with the Panels of Experts on the Central African Republic, 
South Sudan and the Sudan.  
 
  Methodology  
 
3. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal 
Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see 
S/2006/997). The Group based its findings on documents and, wherever possible, on 
first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. When this was not 
possible, the Group corroborated information by using at least three independent 
and reliable sources.  
4. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
there are few documents that provide definitive proof of arms transfers, recruitment, 
command responsibility for grave human rights abuses and the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources. The Group has therefore relied on eyewitness testimony from 
members of local communities, ex-combatants and current members of armed 
groups. The Group has also considered expert testimony by government officials 
and military officers from the Great Lakes region and United Nations sources.  
 
  Cooperation  
 
5. The Group takes note of the support received from the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO). It welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Mission to search for and 
attempt to rescue the two members of the Group of Experts.  
6. During the period under review, the Group met with government officials, 
private sector actors and organizations in seven countries (see annex 1). The Group 
sent 77 requests for information to Governments and companies, and received 
varying levels of compliance with its requests (see annex 2). The present report 
covers investigations up to 15 June 2017. The lack of cooperation by some Member 
States slowed down the Group’s efforts to trace arms and ammunition and hindered 
its investigations on the implementation of individual sanctions.  
 
  Implementation of recommendations of the Group’s midterm report  
 
7. In its midterm report, the Group made five recommendations on its findings 
about arms and natural resources to the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and regional States (S/2016/1102, paras. 119-121). The Group is 
concerned that none of those recommendations has been implemented to date.  
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  Challenges to the implementation of the asset freeze  
 
8. The Group provided technical assistance to banking and microcredit 
institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the implementation of 
United Nations sanctions measures. In this regard, the Group observed a general 
lack of proper communication and procedures concerning United Nations sanctions, 
in particular from the Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the 
local institutions. This resulted in improper action and technical violations of the 
sanctions regime. In addition, there was a lack of a national legal framework 
allowing banks and financial institutions to freeze the assets detained by sanctioned 
individuals and entities without being exposed to litigation procedures.  
 
  Reporting obligations and mandate duration  
 
9. The Group believes that the monthly updates are a useful channel for regular 
communication with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004), for which the Group shall maintain a regular presence in the 
field.  
10. Furthermore, since March 2017, the Group is subject to a special security 
regime, which is more stringent than before. While the Group appreciates the 
attention to the security of its members, it also wishes to highlight that the resulting 
procedures have an impact on the execution of its field investigations. For this 
reason, the Group would deem it appropriate that the next resolution foresee a 
longer mandate (see para. 182 (b) (iii)).  
 
 
 II. Armed groups  
 
 
11. During the period under review, the Group focused its investigations on the 
Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR),1 the Conseil national pour 
le renouveau et la démocratie (CNRD) and their local Nyatura allies. The Group 
also investigated the presence of Burundian armed groups, in particular the Forces 
républicaines du Burundi (FOREBU), and the situation in the Grand Nord including 
the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Mai Mai groups. In addition, this section 
includes reports on the return of some elements of the ex-23 March movement 
(M23) and challenges linked to the reintegration of recently demobilized 
ex-combatants.  
12. In North Kivu Province, during 2017, there was continued insecurity and 
recurrent fighting involving several interconnected armed groups across Rutshuru 
and Masisi territories. This was most notable in the Bashali-Mokoto (Masisi 
territory) and Bwito (Rutshuru territory) chiefdoms (see annex 3). As previously 
reported by the Group (see S/2016/466, paras. 6-18; and S/2016/1102, paras. 8-30), 
the presence of two armed groups originating in Rwanda, FDLR and CNRD, 
remained a key enabler for the continuing insecurity. The Group’s investigations 
suggested that FDLR remained the stronger of the two and prevailed in terms of 
alliances with local armed groups, in particular Nyatura factions. CNRD however 
benefited from both the occasional collaboration with elements of the Forces armées 
de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) as well as the latter’s current 
focus on fighting FDLR (see paras. 19-20).  
__________________ 
 
1  Unless otherwise specified, “FDLR” refers to the FDLR-FOCA (Forces combattantes 
Abacunguzi), as opposed to other splinter groups, such as the Rassemblement pour l’unité et la 
démocratie-Urunana or CNRD.  
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13. The Group noted a similar trend in the Grand Nord area where various Mai 
Mai groups have emerged during the period of reporting. While their names are 
new, they draw upon longer-term dynamics of armed mobilization. In addition, their 
activities are interconnected and in reaction to recent violence, including that of 
ADF and local militia networks. In South Kivu Province, the main networks thrive 
around and against Burundian armed groups, such as FOREBU. In response to these 
increasingly networked conflict settings, the Group organized its findings on armed 
groups according to the different connecting logics in the following subsections.  
 
 
 A. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda  
 
 
14. The Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda are a foreign armed group 
emanating from the former Forces armées rwandaises (ex-FAR) and operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2000. While weakened by FARDC -led 
Sukola II operations (see S/2016/466, paras. 10-15) and the breakaway of CNRD 
(see S/2016/1102, paras. 10-13), FDLR still showed resilience. This was mainly due 
to ongoing recruitment, alliances with local armed groups, the ability to generate 
revenues and its internal restructuring, including the dissolution of the Apollo sector 
and the Comete subsector (whose majority had defected to CNRD; see annex 4), 
making Sinai and Canaan the remaining sectors of FDLR (see annex 5).  
15. Since the Group’s last report, the FDLR senior leadership has not undergone 
many changes (see S/2016/1102, annex 5). In October 2016, the FDLR command 
decided to divide its headquarters between two different locations (see annex 6). By 
mid-2017, FDLR maintained no relevant positions outside Rutshuru territory. FDLR 
also lost two senior leaders: on 23 October 2016 “Colonel” Joseph Habyarimana 
(also known as Sophonie Mucebo), the FDLR head of military intelligence, was 
arrested by FARDC. On 12 November 2016, Mathias Gatabazi (also known as 
Enock Dusabe), the FDLR political commissioner, was captured by local CNRD 
allies and handed over to FARDC.  
 
  Alliances and recruitment  
 
16. Nyatura ex-combatants as well as FDLR and CNRD members told the Group 
that FDLR was able to recuperate allies erstwhile lost to CNRD. While local 
Nyatura groups (see S/2016/1102, paras. 44-52) were divided over siding with either 
FDLR or CNRD after the split, the Group observed a clear shift towards FDLR 
again in 2017. Internal FDLR documents seen by the Group contained instructions 
to FDLR units, most recently in November 2016, to cultivate relations with loca l 
authorities and intensify collaboration with local allies. Based on convergent 
testimony by FDLR ex-combatants, the Group believes these “local allies” to be 
Nyatura groups (see annex 7). FDLR leaders also discussed the possibility of 
reviving an alliance with the Rassemblement pour l’unité et la démocratie (RUD) -
Urunana (see S/2011/738, paras. 128-134). In September 2016, a decision was taken 
“to welcome back CNRD defectors” (see annex 8).  
17. Combatants, military sources and local populations told the Group that FDLR 
continues to entertain cordial relations with the Alliance des patriotes pour un 
Congo libre et souverain (APCLS), a Mai Mai group led by “General” Janvier 
Karairi Buingo (see S/2011/738, paras. 219-237). FDLR also managed to foster 
novel coalitions such as the Alliance des patriotes pour la restauration de la 
démocratie au Congo (APRDC) and the Collectif des mouvements pour le 
changement (CMC) (see annex 9). Sources close to FDLR told the Group that this is 
consistent with previous attempts by FDLR to blend itself into local armed groups 
S/2017/672 
 
 
17-11025 8/111 
 
(see S/2016/466, paras. 92-99).2 Nyatura factions that adhere to these coalitions 
were involved in attacks in April and May 2017. The Group notes that both FDLR 
and CMC communiqués can be found at intabaza.com (see paras. 24 -26).  
18. The Group collected evidence that FDLR continued to recruit combatants, 
including from Rwandan refugees but also among the Congolese Hutu population 
and in some cases from Rwandan refugee camps outside the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (see annex 10). At the same time, defections remained a serious 
challenge to FDLR.  
 
  Fighting against CNRD and FARDC  
 
19. Internal documents shed light on how FDLR envisaged confronting CNRD, 
including the option of setting up a parallel command in South Kivu Province, 
capturing CNRD combatants as well as through propaganda (see annex 11), for 
instance through a communiqué signed by the acting FDLR president (see 
annex 12). Ex-combatants told the Group that, after a temporary lull, FDLR -CNRD 
clashes resumed from April 2017, with heavy participation of certain Nyatura 
factions. After intense combats, CNRD left its positions around the localities of 
Katsiru and around Mweso to almost completely retreat to the north -west into 
Walikale territory, as confirmed by local authorities and other sources to the Group.  
20. On the other side of the Virunga National Park, Sukola II operations have 
started targeting FDLR again since mid-April 2017. United Nations and military 
sources confirmed that FARDC progressed towards the FDLR heartland north of 
Nyiragongo and Nyamulagira volcanoes in an attempt to target the senior leadership 
as well as the headquarters of the FDLR Commando de recherche et d’action en 
profondeur (CRAP) in this area.3 While the senior leadership of FDLR was 
concentrated in a small area by mid-2017, they still retained bases in different, 
sometimes hardly accessible positions, further complicating the task of dismantling 
them.  
 
  Local supply and support  
 
21. Supply and support are of vital importance to FDLR, especially since the onset 
of Sukola II operations (see S/2016/466, paras. 10-15; and S/2016/1102, 
paras. 14-17). As previously reported, there is no shortage of weapons in most 
FDLR units but ammunition remained a challenge. FDLR ex-combatants told the 
Group that usually AK-47 rounds cost around CGF 200 and uniforms cost 
US$ 10-20 when they buy them from individual FARDC soldiers, consistent with 
previously reported patterns (see S/2014/428, para. 54; S/2015/19, para. 71; and 
para. 159 below).4 This can also take the form of barter, for example when FDLR 
sells marijuana or agricultural goods against ammunition.  
22. The Group noted that FDLR maintained their system of “non-conventional 
logistics”, with certain units or parts of units tasked to generate revenues in cash 
and kind through agriculture, fishing, charcoal and timber as well as trade and 
__________________ 
 
2  The Alliance des patriotes pour la restauration de la démocratie au Congo published a video 
displaying CMC combatants on its Twitter feed at https://twitter.com/aprdcongo/status  
/834982505837117442 (last accessed on 15 June 2017).   
 
3  This concerns acting president “Major General” Gaston Iyamuremye (also known as Victor 
Byiringiro or Rumuli, CDi.003), FOCA commander “Lieutenant General” Sylvestre Mudacumura 
(also known as Bernard Mupenzi or Pharaoh, CDi.012), and his deputy, “Brigadier General” 
Pacifique Ntawunguka (also known as Omega Israel, CDi.024). “Colonel” Protogène 
Ruvugayimikore (also known as Gaby Ruhinda) commands the CRAP units.  
 
4  On 15 June 2017, the official exchange rate between Congolese francs (CGF) and United States 
dollars (US$) was: 1 US$ to 1,400 CGF.  
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taxation (see S/2016/466, annex 4). Ex-combatants told the Group about a unit 
called La vie (“life”) whose mission was to negotiate the illicit taxes local 
populations are required to pay (see paras. 133-142).  
23. The unit in question was led by an individual known as “Kanyoni” and had 
around 30 combatants. La vie operates near FARDC positions in Kagando and 
Bambu. Other than taxation, FDLR units also rent or occupy arable land to engage 
in their own agriculture. Ex-combatants told the Group that standard units do 
“non-conventional logistics”, while the CRAP special forces are alimented by the 
former and focus on operations only.  
 
  External support networks  
 
24. During the period under review, the Group observed that the websites 
intabaza.com, umucunguzi.com (Radio Umucunguzi), urugaga.org and rwacu.org 
(the Rwandan cultural society — RCS) promoted the ideology and the activities of 
FDLR and possibly raised money on their behalf via donations on a PayPal account 
of RCS, to which all the aforementioned websites redirected (see annex 13). The 
Group sent a request for information to PayPal Holdings, Inc. and is awaiting a 
reply.  
25. The websites are all hosted in the Netherlands under the IP address 
188.121.43.37 and administered by Ignace Ntirushwamaboko (also known as Darius 
“Sunray” Murinzi), residing in Canada. On 28 February 2014, Iyamuremye (also the 
acting president of the Front commun pour la libération du Rwanda (FCLR) -
Ubumwe) designated Ntirushwamaboko as the FCLR representative for North 
America.5 The Group found that Ntirushwamaboko published on the FCLR 
Facebook page until March 2016 and posted FDLR declarations on his own 
Facebook page until October 2016.  
26. Supporting FDLR, an entity listed by the Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1533 (2004), is a sanctionable offence under paragraph 7 (g) of Security 
Council resolution 2293 (2016). The Group sent requests for further information to 
the concerned parties, in particular regarding the money flows associated with the 
aforementioned websites to ascertain if those flows benefited FDLR, either directly 
or indirectly, and is awaiting their response.  
 
 
 B. Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie  
 
 
27. The Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie is a foreign armed 
group that emerged following a split within FDLR (see S/2016/1102, para. 23). 
Since the Group’s last report, CNRD has been weakened through arrests, defections, 
and the loss of most of its allies in North Kivu Province, with the exception of 
occasional FARDC collaboration. The Group collected new evidence regarding the 
split and its reverberations on the Rwandan refugee populations.  
 
  Leadership and locations  
 
28. While “Colonel” Laurent Ndagijimana (also known as Wilson Irategeka or 
Lumbago) remains its leader, CNRD lost three senior officers: sanctioned individual 
and operations commander “Colonel” Félicien Nzanzubukire (also known as Fred 
Irakeza, CDi.023) and South Kivu sector commander “Colonel” Anastase 
Munyaneza (also known as Job Kuramba) were arrested by Congolese security 
services in Makobola and Uvira, respectively. Nzanzubukire was arrested on his 
__________________ 
 
5  See http://www.therwandan.com/ki/2014/02/28/ibyemezo -byinama-yihuriro-fclr-ubumwe-
yateranye-kuwa-25-gashyantare-2014/ (last accessed on 15 June 2017).  
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way to a cash transfer agency with a fake Congolese electoral card under the name 
“Justin Makila” (see annex 14). “Colonel” Wellars Nsengiyumva (also known as 
Come) surrendered to MONUSCO and was repatriated to Rwanda.  
29. “Colonel” Harerimana Hamada (also known as Mulamba Junior) remains the 
overall military commander (see annex 15). At the time of writing, the Group 
estimated the CNRD areas of influence in North Kivu Province to be reduced to the 
north of the Mweso-Pinga road, where Ndagijimana is located alongside “Colonel” 
Antoine Hakizimana (also known as Jeva) and “Lt. Colonel” Marc Nzeyimana (also 
known as Masambaka). In South Kivu Province, the CNRD headquarters is located 
near the town of Hewa Bora, from where it deploys mainly within Fizi  territory.  
 
  Collaboration between CNRD and elements of FARDC  
 
30. Three local sources in Bwito chiefdom told the Group they would regularly 
see CNRD and FARDC officers having meetings. FARDC officers told the Group 
that this was due to the high-quality intelligence they could gather from CNRD 
officers to help capture Mudacumura. CNRD also cohabitated with FARDC 
elements at revenue-generating checkpoints, for instance near the localities of 
Katsiru, Bweru and Kashuga.  
31. In September 2016, CNRD supported FARDC operations aimed at capturing 
senior FDLR leaders near Kamondoka and Kiyeye. In October 2016, the Group 
witnessed the friendly handover from CNRD to FARDC in Katsiru. Three FARDC 
elements told the Group that they were “here with CNRD now”. Civilians confirmed 
that as FARDC reached Katsiru, CNRD began preparing for an orderly retreat to 
take up surrounding positions.  
32. The Group could not establish whether and to what extent this collaboration 
was sanctioned or known to the FARDC hierarchy. The Group sent an official 
communication to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in June 
2017 but has not yet received a reply.  
 
  Update on the FDLR/CNRD split and the refugee situation  
 
33. In its previous report, the Group analysed the split of CNRD from FDLR (see 
S/2016/1102, paras. 10-13). During the past months, the Group collected further 
evidence and testimony as to the reasons for the split. Senior FDLR members told 
the Group that the divergences over the technicalities of a biometric refugee census 
were just the straw that broke the camel’s back, with a separation having been 
foreseeable for at least one or two years before CNRD was created in May 2016 
(see annex 16).  
34. Two ex-FDLR officers told the Group that, in order to motivate combatants to 
join CNRD, Ndagijimana initially paid salaries to combatants, offered bonuses for 
weapons they brought along and used politically charged arguments, including the 
prospect of a “dignified return” to Rwanda. Operational dynamics just after the split 
reinforced this narrative as FDLR sustained several months of significant pressure 
from FARDC as well as attacks from Nduma défense du Congo -Rénové (NDC-R) 
and certain Mai Mai Mazembe factions.  
35. Changes in the political organization of the Rwandan refugees in North Kivu 
Province also mirror the schism between FDLR and CNRD. Hitherto unified within 
the Societé civile des Rwandais réfugiés en RDC (SOCIRWA), parts of the refugee 
community created the Societé civile internationale des réfugiés rwandais (SOCIR) 
in January 2017, led by Anastase Kamuhanda, who is also the CNRD humanitarian 
commissioner (see S/2016/1102, annex 16). During the period under review, the 
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Group observed that SOCIRWA maintained a traditional pro -FDLR stance while 
SOCIR leans towards CNRD (see annex 17).  
36. Several ex-combatants told the Group that the refugees for the most part 
decided to support FDLR or CNRD on the basis of family ties or geographical 
origins. Sources close to the refugee community told the Group that a slight 
majority of refugees remained organized in SOCIRWA. Early in 2017, the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the 
number of Rwandan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at 245,000. 
The Group was not able to independently confirm their number.  
 
 
 C. Nyatura  
 
 
37. As previously reported, at least a dozen smaller, local armed groups also 
operated in Bashali and Bwito (see annex 18). The armed groups in question use the 
name Nyatura, an umbrella term for most Congolese Hutu militias (see 
S/2016/1102, paras. 44-47). While the Group identified around a dozen factions, it 
focused its investigations on the three strongest, led by “Colonel” Kasongo Kalamo, 
“Colonel” Ndaruhutse Kamanzi, also known as Domi, and “Lt. Colonel” 
Muhawenimana Bunombe, also known as John Love.  
38. The Group believes that, during the period under review, certain Nyatura 
factions committed acts sanctionable under Security Council resolution 2293 
(2016). For example, Kasongo continued to recruit civilians into his group, and John 
Love continued to buy ammunition from individual State security agents. While the 
Group had previously reported that Nyatura factions were divided between FDLR 
and CNRD after the split in May 2016 (see S/2016/1102, para. 44), five 
ex-combatants told the Group that most of them allied to FDLR again, this being a 
sanctionable offence.  
39. Both in northern Bwito, where intercommunal fighting continued (see 
S/2016/1102, paras. 103-107) and around the CNRD-FDLR frontlines between 
Bashali and southern Bwito, Nyatura often took a frontline role, increasing the 
firepower of the more organized FDLR and CNRD that provide training, supplies 
and ideology.  
 
  Nyatura Kasongo/Groupe de sécurité  
 
40. The Groupe de sécurité, or the Forces de défense des droits de l’homme, is a 
Nyatura group led by Kasongo. Local authorities in Bashali -Mokoto told the Group 
that Kasongo continued to operate in their chiefdom in 2017, with strongholds 
around Mweso and Kashuga. Nyatura ex-combatants told the Group that other 
Nyatura leaders, including Ngwiti Bahati and “Noheri”, operate under his influence. 
According to three Nyatura ex-combatants, Kasongo continued to recruit among the 
local Hutu population, despite his commitment to the Bashali demobilization 
ceremony organized in 2016 (see S/2016/1102, paras. 51-52). The Group notes that 
obstructing demobilization is a sanctionable offence.  
41. Kasongo’s group is made up of approximately 100 to 200 combatants, not all 
of them carrying individual weapons. Local State officials and civil society actors 
told the Group that, in Mweso and Kashuga, Kasongo is able to detain people and 
organize trials in collaboration with individual officers of the Congolese national 
police and other State institutions. In March 2017, Kasongo terminated a short -lived 
alliance with CNRD over a row regarding taxation and Kasongo’s perception that 
CNRD did not live up to its commitment to return to Rwanda but instead sought 
contacts with returning ex-M23. In May 2017, Kasongo’s group drove CNRD to the 
north of the Mweso-Kashuga road.  
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  Nyatura Domi and Nyatura John Love  
 
42. As previously reported (S/2016/1102, paras. 48-50), Domi and John Love 
remain close allies of FDLR in Bwito chiefdom. Domi is a former member of the 
Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais who created his own armed group in 
Bukombo grouping (see S/2008/773, paras. 114-120). Nyatura factions led by Nzayi 
Kanyange and “Jean-Marie” respond to him. FDLR documents suggest that, since 
2014, Domi and John Love have a coordination structure involving “General” 
Benjamin Ndikuyeze, whom the Group identifies as the head of APRDC (see 
annex 19 and para. 17 above).  
43. Local authorities and sources close to FDLR told the Group that Nyatura 
Domi — with support from FDLR — attacked a FARDC position east of Kitchanga 
on 8 May 2017. The operation was aimed at liberating detained combatants and 
seizing ammunition. Assaulting with considerable firepower, they killed four FARDC 
soldiers and freed 12 prisoners, including a FDLR officer, according to witnesses 
that spoke to the Group. Ex-combatants emphasized that Nyatura John Love 
continued to work closely with FDLR “Major” Evariste Ndayishimiye (alias 
Gouverneur Kizito). Two ex-combatants of a Nyatura John Love unit led by 
“Captain Kasigwa” also told the Group they continued to collaborate with FDLR, for 
training, and with individual policemen to buy ammunition for CGF 200 per round.   
44. During the reporting period, Nyatura Domi maintained strongholds between 
Bukombo and Katsiru while Nyatura John Love had their headquarters in Muriki, 
exerting influence west and north up to Nyanzale and Kibirizi, respectively. 
Customary authorities in Bwito and sources close to FDLR told the Group that 
Nyatura Domi imposed taxes on approximately 3,000 households, including 
internally displaced persons from the camps near Kitchanga: CGF 1,000 monthly 
for the lala salama (“sleep peacefully”) tax and a quarterly harvest tax of $5 per 
household. The Group estimates that these taxes, if collected without interruption, 
could yield up to an annual maximum of $40,000 to Nyatura Domi and its allies. 
Representatives of the internally displaced persons confirmed this pattern.  
 
 
 D. Forces républicaines du Burundi  
 
 
45. The Group had previously reported on Burundian armed groups, focusing on 
the Forces nationales de libération (FNL)-Nzabampema (see S/2016/466, 
paras. 42-45), and the Résistance pour un Etat de droit (RED)-Tabara, also known as 
FRONABU-Tabara (see S/2016/466, paras. 33-41; see annex 20 for both). During 
the period under review, the Group observed further mobilization of Burundian 
armed groups on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as 
interference by the Forces de défense nationale (FDN) (see paras. 148 -150). 
FOREBU, which has no particular ideology besides opposing the Government of 
Burundi, emerged as the most relevant Burundian armed group operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo by mid-2017.  
 
  Leadership and locations  
 
46. Since December 2015, FOREBU has been under the command of Colonel 
Edouard Nshimirimana, a FDN defector, and his second -in-command “Colonel” 
Abdu Rugwe. It is mainly active in Uvira and Fizi territories. FOREBU 
headquarters used to be located in the hills above Lusenda refugee camp, where 
UNHCR had registered over 26,000 Burundians by February 2017. During May and 
June, sources told the Group that significant elements of FOREBU had relocated 
towards Kiriama, in the hills above Runingu (see annex 21). Ex -combatants told the 
Group that FOREBU are made up of FDN defectors and newly recruited civilians, 
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including from Lusenda camp. Several ex-combatants told the Group they had 
earlier been involved with RED-Tabara as trainers (see S/2016/466, paras. 33-41), 
but had left since they disagreed with that group’s ideology.  
47. While Colonel Nshimirimana leads FOREBU on the ground, five ex -members 
of the movement and as many FARDC officers told the Group that Hussein 
Radjabu, a former-leader-turned-dissident of the ruling party of Burundi, the 
Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la 
démocratie (CNDD-FDD), is their political leader. Many FOREBU members had 
ties to the Union pour la démocratie et le développement (UPD) -Zigamibanga, a 
political party created by Mr. Radjabu after he left CNDD -FDD. Speaking to the 
Group by telephone in June 2017, Mr. Radjabu acknowledged the existence of 
FOREBU but denied being its leader and stated not being aware of any FOREBU 
activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
 
  Supply and alliances  
 
48. The Group collected convergent testimony about the logistics of recruitment as 
well as the supply of arms and ammunition. While Nshimirimana initially arrived 
with around 30 people in December 2015, FOREBU can be estimated to have 
between 300 and 500 combatants as of May 2017. Ex-combatants and FARDC 
officers told the Group that several waves of recruits arrived throughout 2016 from 
Burundi, mainly by boat from Rumonge to Swima and via Uvira. The Group also 
found that four Ugandan nationals were arrested by Congolese intelligence in 
February 2017 for attempting to join FOREBU (see annex 22). Many FOREBU 
combatants wear military uniforms and carry AK -47-pattern rifles, but also heavier 
weapons, including light machine guns.  
49. Civilian populations in Fizi territory told the Group that, in most cases, 
FOREBU members would buy whole harvests of nearby fields or go to local 
markets instead of taxing supplies from local populations. This modus operandi 
suggests that FOREBU might enjoy certain forms of external support. Lusenda 
residents and civil society members told the Group that many combatants also had 
access to tokens allowing them to participate in food distribution events at Lusenda 
camp. FOREBU ex-combatants told the Group that further supplies were brought in 
across Lake Tanganyika in boats, including one named ubumo iwacu (“our unity”). 
50. Late in 2016, FOREBU cohabitated with Mai Mai Réunion in northern Fizi 
territory according to the armed group’s ex-combatants. Congolese intelligence 
services confirmed this. In addition, FOREBU tried to establish ties with other 
Congolese Mai Mai groups. At the same time, FARDC carried out several military 
offensives against FOREBU and other Burundian armed groups. This led to the 
detention of dozens of suspected Burundian combatants who confirmed to the 
Group that, in some instances, Congolese armed groups, including the Ngumino, 
would help to facilitate such detention.  
 
 
 E. Armed mobilization in the Grand Nord area  
 
 
51. During the period under review, violence in Beni territory decreased compared 
to the recent past (see S/2016/466, paras. 185-213). In the meantime, armed 
mobilization around Butembo has significantly increased since the Group’s last 
report (see S/2016/1102, para. 103). In addition to ADF, the Group focused its 
investigations on three armed groups: Mai Mai Kilalo, Mai Mai Mazembe and Mai 
Mai Corps du Christ. While they have no integrated command structure, they s hare 
a narrative of “protecting the civilian population” against FDLR and massacres 
attributed to ADF. The Group is not aware, however, of any fighting between these 
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armed groups and ADF. Instead, certain Mai Mai groups committed sanctionable 
acts, including attacks against peacekeepers (see para. 56) and internally displaced 
persons (see para. 58).  
 
  Allied Democratic Forces  
 
52. In 2017, senior FARDC officers informed the Group that the Sukola I 
operations against ADF had slowed down and no large-scale attacks against 
civilians had occurred since the Rwangoma massacre on 13 August 2016 (see 
S/2016/1102, annex 34). The Group takes note of the recent military trial to 
establish responsibility for the massacres, held in Beni from February to April 2017. 
However, it is too early to assess the trial’s long -term impact on the security 
situation. The Group limits its conclusions to certain specific aspects, focusing on 
abductions leading to large-scale forced recruitment, being a major violation of 
Security Council resolution 2293 (2016). The Government of Uganda reiterated that 
the Group cannot interview sanctioned individual Jamil Mukulu (CDi.015), arrested 
in April 2015 in the United Republic of Tanzania, until his trial in Uganda is over.  
53. Ex-combatants, FARDC officers and former abductees told the Group that a 
core ADF group remained intact, operating out of Madina II (Bayt al -Mal, Whisper, 
Bango and Hedikota/Headquarters) and near Mwalika (Camp Ya Miba) (see 
S/2016/1102, paras. 31-43, for both). Several sources confirmed that Seka Baluku 
(Madina II), Benjamin Kisokeranyo (Mwalika) and an individual known as Fee za 
(“mobile group”) remained key ADF leaders. The Group noted that local militias 
continued to operate around the ADF zone of influence, some of them having family 
ties to ADF leaders. Four sources told the Group that Feeza maintained relations 
with a militia based in Bambuba-Kisiki grouping.  
54. The Group documented several cases of abductions leading to forced 
recruitment. In one case, seven people were kidnapped near Irungu, south of the 
Beni-Kasindi road, in March 2016. They were brought northwards unt il they 
reached a camp complex including Whisper, Bango and Headquarters (see 
annex 23). Most people in the camp spoke Luganda and Swahili. Three individuals 
told the Group that the leader was Baluku and recognized him in pictures. They 
estimated the camp population to be around 300 to 500 people, most of them 
combatants armed with AK-47-pattern rifles and wearing a mix of civilian clothes, 
FARDC camouflage and older green fatigues. The Group notes that the latter were 
reintroduced to avoid ambiguity between FARDC and armed groups. Two sources 
told the Group they were forced into agricultural labour and had to abide by a tight 
set of rules, such as not cooking at night to avoid being detected. This is consistent 
with the Group’s previous findings (see S/2016/1102, paras. 40-43). Between the 
abduction and their escape in January 2017, all the witnesses interviewed by the 
Group gave consistent testimony about one attack against the camp, led from nearby 
FARDC positions.  
55. Since late 2016, the Group has observed several events in which abductions 
ended in a prompt release. On 13 February 2017, a group of seven farmers and two 
children were kidnapped in their fields near Mayangose and subsequently released 
on 25 February 2017, carrying two messages, the first one for the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo: “[…] tell the Government that they can 
never chase us from this forest. Waging war will not lead to anything, if there are no 
talks, nothing will change.” A second message was addressed to the farmers 
themselves: “If we kill you it is because you talk too much and inform the FARDC 
of our whereabouts.” Several of the farmers recognized Feeza as the leader of the 
kidnappers. They also reported that his troops were wearing a mix of camouflage 
and green FARDC uniforms.  
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  Mai Mai Kilalo/Union des patriotes pour la libération du Congo  
 
56. Mai Mai Kilalo is also known as the Union des patriotes pour la libération du 
Congo (UPLC). Its leader Katembo Kilalo is locally renowned for the production of 
dawa, the potion allegedly used to render combatants invincible (see annex 24). 
According to ex-combatants, Kilalo had previously served in the Mai Mai groups of 
Kakule Sikuli “Lafontaine” (see S/2011/738, paras. 266-269) and Paul Sadala 
“Morgan” (see S/2013/433, paras. 72-78). His deputies are “Colonel” Benoit 
Mumbere Malisawa and “Colonel” Kakule Kitelemire (alias Saperita or Mambari 
Bini Pélé), a former Mai Mai and FARDC. Ex-combatants told the Group that this 
armed group was based around Vurondo, north-west of Butembo (see annex 25) and 
responsible for the attack against MONUSCO in Butembo on 19 December 2016 
(see paras. 177-179).  
57. Ex-combatants and FARDC officers told the Group that Mai Mai Kilalo had 
200 to 300 combatants, though not all of them had individual guns. The Group 
collected testimonies of ex-combatants who were forced into Mai Mai Kilalo 
following abductions or initially lured by fake promises of employment by 
recruiters, for instance out of a football club called FC Mahamba B. Mai  Mai Kilalo 
sustained itself through taxation (see annex 26), including in farms ($5 per 
farm/ week or one goat/month) and at checkpoints (CGF 1,500 per motorcycle, CGF 
500 per pedestrian).  
 
  Mai Mai Mazembe/Union des patriotes pour la défense des innocents  
 
58. Mai Mai Mazembe is a network of loosely connected armed groups, some of 
which also use the name Union des patriotes pour la défense des innocents, that 
emerged in 2015 in Lubero territory (see S/2016/466, paras. 78-79). On 27 November 
2016, Mai Mai Mazembe combatants attacked the internally displaced persons camp 
in Luhanga, where they suspected FDLR elements were hiding. At least 30 internally  
displaced persons were killed during the attack, which followed a series  of other 
assaults (see annex 27 and S/2016/1102, paras. 103-107). In line with previous 
findings, the Group observed the spread of xenophobic tracts featuring endorsements  
of Mai Mai Mazembe to “defend the Nande against the Hutu” (see annex 28 and 
S/2016/466, annex 59).  
59. Mazembe factions operated relatively independent from each other and with 
limited logistics. It is thus not possible to exactly enumerate their effectives. Three 
ex-combatants told the Group, that one “brigade” had 100 elements but only 
15 firearms. Like other Mai Mai groups, Mazembe tried to protect themselves from 
enemy fire through dawa. Ex-combatants told the Group that Mazembe’s main 
leaders were “Kabido”, “Colonel” Augustin Kambale, “General” Muhindo Kitete 
Bushu and “Colonel” Albert Kasheke.  
 
  Mai Mai Corps du Christ  
 
60. Early in October 2016, a coalition of Mai Mai groups entered Beni with the 
aim of fighting ADF (see annex 29). While most carried amulets and spears, there 
were also some with firearms. The Group could trace back this coalition’s origin to 
an armed group called Corps du Christ, based out of Mont Carmel near Butembo. 
FARDC officers and ex-combatants told the Group that Corps du Christ repeatedly 
clashed with FARDC between October and December 2016, including near the 
Butembo-Beni road and at Mont Carmel, which FARDC retook on 3 November. 
Until his surrender to MONUSCO on 13 December 2016, the armed group’s leader 
was Baraka Lolwako Mumbere, known for usually wearing a Congolese national 
police uniform.  
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61. After Baraka’s surrender, David Maranatha took over the leadership. However, 
on 9 January 2017, in a radio broadcast in Swahili, sanctioned individual Kakolele 
Bwambale (CDi.002) proclaimed himself leader of Corps du Christ. Individuals 
associated with Corps du Christ and intelligence sources told the Group that 
Maranatha and Kakolele met in mid-January in Nairobi to discuss how to reorganize 
the movement. On 7 February, FARDC military intelligence arrested Maranatha but, 
on 11 June 2017, he managed to escape on the occasion of an attack on Kangbayi 
prison in Beni that set free around 930 of the 960 inmates. Corps du Christ 
maintained relations with Kakule Sikuli (see S/2011/738, paras. 266-269) and 
Charles Bokande (see S/2016/466, paras. 81-91).  
 
 
 F. Former 23 March movement  
 
 
62. Starting in mid-January 2017, an estimated 200 ex-M23 returned to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, led by sanctioned individual “Brigadier 
General” Sultani Makenga (CDi.008), the former military leader of M23. While the 
Group notes that armed group incursions into the Democratic Republic of the  Congo 
are threats to peace and stability, its findings suggest that this incident was a short -
lived, unsuccessful attempt to revive M23. During the period under review, the 
Group could not find any indication of external support for this incursion. Hence,  
the Group believes that any sustainable solution for the M23 question requires 
rather a political than a military approach, starting with the full implementation of 
the Nairobi Declaration of December 2013.  
 
  Escape from Bihanga and reorganization in Virunga National Park  
 
63. Ex-M23 combatants interviewed by the Group in Rwanda, Goma and Rutshuru 
confirmed that they had escaped from Bihanga camp in Uganda. Of the 1,375 
ex-combatants who arrived there in 2013, only 270 remained in February 2017 
according to the Government of Uganda. Several ex-M23 combatants told the Group 
there were no entry or exit controls in Bihanga, allowing them to escape in small 
groups. While concordant sources estimated that around 200 ex-M23 combatants 
managed to cross into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ugandan security 
forces intercepted 101 escapees in Mbarara on 18 January 2017 (see annex 30).  
64. From Bihanga, most ex-M23 took buses towards Mbarara, before arriving in 
the area of Kisoro. FARDC officers and guards of the Virunga National Park 
underlined the challenges of performing effective and accurate border control given 
the lack of clear signposting. Talking to the Group, surrendered  ex-M23 confirmed 
they crossed the border by night using forest paths to reach a meeting point near 
Mount Sabyinyo. Around 150 elements gathered there, including Makenga, 
“Lt. Colonel” Léon Kanyamibwa, “Colonel” Yusuf Mboneza and Erasto Bahati (see 
S/2012/348, para. 68, box 1 and annex 18; S/2012/348/Add.1, para. 38; and 
S/2013/433, para. 44). Ex-combatants told the Group that some of the commanders 
steered the sequential escape with the help of middlemen and mobile money 
transfers. The Group was unable to trace those transfers.  
65. From Mount Sabyinyo, the main part of this armed group moved south and 
established camps inside Virunga National Park just south of Mount Mikeno. 
Though poorly equipped with only around a dozen rifles (mostly recovered 
individually near Cyanzu and Runyoni), most combatants were given a pair of new 
boots. Most officers had handheld VHF radios and cell phones. Surrendered 
combatants reported that food supply was poor and very few officers wore uniforms, 
including Congolese, Ugandan and Rwandan ones.  
 
 
S/2017/672 
 
17/111 17-11025 
 
  Clashes between ex-M23 and FARDC  
 
66. On 27 January 2017, two FARDC Mi-24 helicopters crashed at the southern 
flank of Mount Mikeno while searching for suspected ex -M23 positions in the area. 
The Group believes that the first helicopter collided with a tree during low altitude 
manoeuvres while the second went down because of a technical defect (see 
annex 31). Despite the losses, FARDC dislodged the ex-M23, killing four and 
capturing three; the rest fled, 30 of them crossing to Rwanda unarmed, on 
29 January 2017 (see annex 32). They were granted temporary refugee status by the 
Government of Rwanda and were visited by the Group in May 2017. The remaining 
ex-M23 combatants moved back north towards the Sabyinyo area where they 
merged with about 70 elements that had arrived from Uganda in the first half of 
February. With a total of over 150, this group reorganized into three “companies”, 
one of which remained near Sabyinyo, one near Bunagana and the third attempted to 
move towards Masisi territory.  
67. On 21 February 2017, FARDC attacked the ex-M23 near the localities of 
Songa and Karambi. They met little resistance and over 50 ex-M23 moved towards 
Kitagoma on 22 February before they fled back into Uganda where at least 42 of 
them were arrested by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, including “Lt. Colonel” 
Ezechiel Mikekeno and “Colonel” Eric Ngabo (see annex 33). FARDC killed 12 
ex-M23 combatants, recovered four weapons and registered that seven persons had 
been admitted to Rutshuru hospital.  
 
 
 G. Cases of participants in disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration returning to Mai Mai groups  
 
 
68. The Group is concerned about the remobilization patterns of ex -combatants 
who had undergone the third National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration in Kamina and Kitona. While the Group has not undertaken a full, 
countrywide investigation, the following snapshot suggests that challenges linked to 
the reintegration of ex-combatants remain the most difficult part of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration programmes.  
69. One example involved the former Mai Mai groups led by Mateke Wilondja 
“Mayele” and “Diego Maradona”. Both underlined that some of their former 
combatants rejoined other armed groups after having returned from the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The Group collected 
information on 12 ex-combatants of Mai Mai Kashilogozi, who returned from 
Kamina in June 2017 and remobilized with Mai Mai Masabo (ex-Mai Mai Baleke) 
(see S/2012/843, para. 113). Five returnees and other sources told the Group that  
ex-combatants returning from the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
programme to Masisi and Rutshuru have rejoined armed groups, including Nyatura 
and Mai Mai groups. During the period of reporting, however, the Group was not 
able to systematically establish the total number of remobilized participants in the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme across the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.  
70. In the framework of the third National Programme for Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration, a total of 4,656 Congolese ex-combatants (1,561 
in Kitona and 2,216 in Kamina), of which 3,777 have already returned home, 
underwent demobilization. The Group also learned that 879 ex -combatants remained 
in the centres as of June 2017 (see annex 34). Ex-combatants also noted that 
reintegration activities were carried out in a partial manner only, and that the 
practical training lacked the necessary materials. This reflects the continuation of 
the challenges the Group previously noted (see S/2015/19, annex 23). Official 
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statistics obtained by the Group suggested that 80 per cent of the kits were 
distributed across the country. However, returnees interviewed by the Group stated 
that they received incomplete or the wrong kits, meaning they lacked the tools 
required for their chosen career. The Group believes that this situation was an 
opportunity for commanders to lure demobilized combatants into joining armed 
groups again.  
 
 
 III. Natural resources  
 
 
71. During the period under review the Group documented several breaches of the 
mineral chain of custody for tin, tantalum and tungsten in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. In addition, the Group continued its investigations into the trading 
and smuggling of artisanally sourced gold. The Group also investigated charcoal 
production and taxation by FDLR in Rutshuru territory.  
72. The Group’s findings are based on several visits to North Kivu, South Kivu, 
Tshopo, Haut-Katanga and Ituri provinces. The Group also conducted visits to 
Kampala, an important hub for smuggled Congolese gold, and to Dubai, the main 
destination market for gold traded from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
the Great Lakes region.  
73. The Group notes that illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources 
remained sources of revenue fuelling the ongoing insecurity in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the same time, criminal networks, including 
inside FARDC, continued to benefit from illicit financial flows and mone y 
laundering associated with mineral smuggling.  
 
 
 A. Tin, tantalum and tungsten  
 
 
74. The Group appreciates that mineral traceability and the due diligence measures 
referred to in paragraph 24 of Security Council resolution 2293 (2016) have allowed 
minerals legally sourced from areas free from interference by armed groups in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo to access international markets.  
75. The above-mentioned positive trends notwithstanding, the Group found that 
the implementation of the ITRI Ltd Tin Supply Chain initiative (iTSCi) traceability 
system in use in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had several shortcomings, 
which could lead to the smuggling of minerals from outside the chain of custody 
into the legal trading circuit. First and foremost, errors or deliberate acts committed 
by agents responsible for tagging, such as tagging mineral consignments from 
non-validated sites, could disrupt the integrity of the whole chain.  
76. Second, the Group found that agents of the Service d’assistance et 
d’encadrement du small-scale mining (SAESSCAM) did not properly implement the 
rules and instructions issued by ITRI Ltd for the handling and overseeing of the 
tagging operations (see annex 35).6 Finally, the iTSCi procedures for the 
safekeeping and storing of tags and logbooks rendered them vulnerable to misuse by 
corrupted agents.  
 
  Illegal sale of tags  
 
77. Négociants informed the Group that in the trading centre of Ndjingala, as well 
as in Mubi and Walikale town, tags were sold on the black market, allowing 
__________________ 
 
6  On 14 June 2017, ITRI Ltd sent a letter to the Group replying to questions addressed in the 
Group’s mid-term report (S/2016/1102) and the present final report.  
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minerals sourced from the non-validated site of Bisie (see S/2014/42, para. 206 and 
annexes 79 and 83) and Mpafu/Nyakoba to permeate the legal chain of custody. Those 
sources informed the Group that tags could be purchased for about $3 per 50 -kg bag 
of minerals, or $500 per 10 tons (equivalent to $2.5 per tagged bag). This is consistent  
with the Group’s previous findings for the Democratic Republic o f the Congo and 
Rwanda (S/2015/19, paras. 173-180 and 189; and S/2015/797, paras. 59-67).  
 
  Bisie  
 
78. ITRI Ltd authorized the tagging of cassiterite, the raw ore for tin, artisanally 
sourced from the non-validated site of Bisie between February and November 2016.  
79. A large number of négociants based in Ndjingala, Mubi, Walikale and Goma 
informed the Group that artisanal production in Bisie continued after November 
2016. They revealed that cassiterite was illegally tagged in Ndjingala trading centre 
as sourced from other validated sites in the area, such as Bisagowa, Kalay Boeing 
and others (see annex 36).  
80. The Group observed that the statistics reported in the iTSCi logbooks showed 
peaks in the production of the aforementioned validated sites around Bisie from 
November 2016 to March 2017. In March 2017, when investigations on tagging 
irregularities in Walikale territory began, the production recorded in iTSCi logbooks 
for Bisagowa and Kalay Boeing dropped to zero.  
81. The Group is of the view that these peaks and drops in production were too  
pronounced to be the result of a normal production cycle and thus reinforce its 
findings that minerals tagged between November 2016 and March 2017 from the 
aforementioned sites did not originate from those sites, but were likely brought in 
from Bisie.  
 
  Mpafu/Nyakoba  
 
82. In furtherance to the above observations, the Group also documented minerals 
extracted since 2015 from the non-validated site of Mpafu/Nyakoba in the Bafuna 
locality of the Wanianga sector in Walikale territory. Those minerals were tagged in 
Walikale town and Mubi as originating from validated sites.  
83. The site of Mpafu/Nyakoba is exploited by the Eglise de la Pentecôte pour 
l’Evangélisation du Monde (EPEM) church, which claims legal ownership of 
mining premises called Nyakoba Canaan EPEM Walikale. The Group saw produced 
minerals stocked in a warehouse on EPEM premises in the village of Nyamianda, 
5 km south of Walikale town (see annex 37).  
84. According to one of the EPEM leaders and to négociants interviewed by the 
Group, EPEM mineral consignments were then tagged in Walikale town and Mubi 
as originating from validated sites, at the price of $3 per tagged bag. These sources 
revealed that the fraud was made possible by the fact that some mining police 
agents, one member of the provincial Division des mines (the technical arm of the 
Ministry of Mines) and SAESSCAM agents in Walikale town, Mubi and Ndjingala 
were EPEM members.  
 
  Transport of minerals  
 
85. The Group documented three cases of fraud along the Walikale -Masisi-Goma 
road. In these cases, transporters carried more minerals than the quantity declared in 
the respective transport authorizations issued by SAESSCAM agents at tagging 
centres (see annex 38).  
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86. Transporters along the aforementioned axis, as well as workshops in Walikale 
town and Mubi, confirmed having reinforced the chassis and suspensions of 
vehicles in order to transport more weight than declared in official documents. 
These sources revealed that most vehicles used by transporters of minerals are 
5-7-ton trucks that are brought up to 10 to 12 tons load capacity or 2 -ton 
camionettes that are reinforced to carry 3 to 4 tons. Transporters informed the Group 
that, while trucks had more load capacity, camionettes were the most used by 
smugglers as they offered more hideouts for minerals (for example, spare tyre bay 
and spaces between the chassis and the plank). These sources and others from the 
Division des mines in Walikale and Masisi territories told the Group that 
transporters regularly bribed SAESSCAM agents to underreport the quantity of 
minerals actually transported in order to partially evade mineral taxes and other tolls.  
87. The Group is aware of projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to 
strengthen the technical capacity to detect fraud in the transport of goods, including 
minerals (such as the installation of six weighbridges along the Kisangani -Walikale-
Masisi-Goma axis). The Group is of the view that such technical means can be a 
useful support but should not be a replacement for the adoption of st ructural 
measures to address the problem of corruption among agents responsible for the 
tagging of minerals.  
 
  Problems with the validation of Mahanga sites  
 
88. In its previous report (S/2016/1102, paras. 80-84), the Group expressed 
concern about the presence of the armed group Forces de défense du Congo (FDC) -
Guides in the mining sites of Rubonga, Kibanda and Mushwao/Maboa, in the 
locality of Mahanga. The sites are exploited by two cooperatives, the Coopérative 
minière pour la promotion des communautés congolaises (COMIPCC) and the 
Coopérative des exploitants miniers de Karamo (CEMIKA), both based in Goma.  
89. The Group visited Mahanga and found that FDC defectors led by “Colonel” 
Tumusifu directly benefited from mining in the site of Rubonga. The Group also 
spoke to members of the Mouvement aquis au changement, an earlier breakaway 
faction of FDC led by “General” Mbura in Buhimba, and to members of APCLS 
stationed in Mahanga. The two villages overlook the mining sites.  
90. According to comptoirs, ITRI Ltd, SAESSCAM in Rubaya and Division des 
mines staff in Nyabiondo, Masisi, Rubaya and Goma interviewed by the Group, 
armed group presence in and around the Mahanga area was known but considered to 
be far enough from the above-mentioned mining sites to not interfere with 
operations; subsequently ITRI Ltd authorized tagging operations from those sites in 
August 2016.  
91. The Group thus observed that, at the time of writing, at least three different 
armed groups (FDC-Guides, MAC and APCLS) occupied areas around validated 
mining sites. APCLS elements led by “Colonel Safari Hibou” and the late “Colonel” 
Tumusifu organized their own police and taxation systems in Mahanga. At the same 
time, FDC controlled Muhima while MAC occupied Buhimba, right next to the 
alluvial mining site of Rubonga.  
92. APCLS elements, local miners and villagers in Mahanga, as well as two 
mining police officers in Nyabiondo, informed the Group that one out of 10 plots of 
the Rubonga mining site along the Bitsombito River benefited “Colonel” Tumusifu 
until his killing in November 2016. Miners working for COMIPCC and CEMIKA 
exploited the remaining nine plots. The Group believes that a part of minerals 
sourced from Rubonga, including during the period when official tagging was still 
allowed, benefited Tumusifu. This constitutes a violation of Security Council 
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resolution 2293 (2016) and a major breach of the due diligence procedures of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
 
  Tagging from sites after their suspension  
 
93. During the period under review, the Group found that tagging of minerals from 
the mining sites of Rubonga (Masisi territory) and Kalay Boeing (Walikale territory) 
continued. This was the case after ITRI Ltd suspended these sites due to the proven 
presence of armed groups there.  
 
  Rubonga  
 
94. On 19 October 2016, following reports of FDC presence, ITRI Ltd decided to 
suspend operations at all Mahanga sites and asked SAESSCAM to hand over tags 
and logbooks. SAESSCAM, however, handed over material to ITRI Ltd only on 
3 November 2016 (see annex 39) and on 30 October 2016 tagged nine bags with a 
total of 421 kg of cassiterite from the Rubonga site produced by COMIPCC (see 
annex 40). ITRI Ltd informed the Group that the aforementioned tags were located 
only in April 2017, six months after they were unduly used, at the premises of a 
comptoir in Goma.  
95. The Group visited Mahanga in January 2017 and performed an air 
reconnaissance in February, observing that production in Rubonga continued despite 
the suspension (although Kibanda and Mushwao/Maboa sites showed much less 
activity). The Group notes that COMIPCC and CEMIKA, the two aforementioned 
mining cooperatives, still operated on the suspended sites: COMIPCC, which 
employed 51 workers on Rubonga site, had consolidated stocks of 1,700 kg of 
cassiterite on 19 December 2016 (see annex 40) and about 2 tons by February 2017, 
in its premises in Nyabiondo. CEMIKA told the Group it had 2 tons stocked in 
Mahanga by late February 2017. The Group also gathered consistent information, 
including by sources close to “General” Mbura, that four négociants from Goma, 
working under his protection, purchased and stocked 1,500 kg of cassiterite in 
Buhimba as of May 2017.  
 
  Kalay Boeing  
 
96. The Group notes that the Mai Mai Simba faction commanded by “General” 
Mando Mazero has made recurrent incursions into the mining site of Kalay Boeing 
since at least 7 January 2017. Speaking to the Group by telephone, “General” 
Mando confirmed the presence of his elements, as well as his intention  to continue 
regular patrols in and around Kalay Boeing in reaction to the continuing influence 
in mining operations of the Biruwe-based FARDC elements.  
97. ITRI Ltd informed the Group that, following those incursions, tagging 
operations at Kalay Boeing were suspended. The Group observed that, despite the 
alleged suspension, iTSCi logbooks reported 38,247 kg of cassiterite tagged from 
Kalay Boeing from 18 to 23 January and 9,513 kg on 4 February. ITRI Ltd informed 
the Group that, of the 73 tags unduly used to tag minerals from Kalay Boeing after 
its suspension, 68 had been located, while five remained missing.  
98. ITRI Ltd also informed the Group that tagging at Kalay Boeing had resumed 
on 12 April 2017 and continued to date. Following “General” Mando’s claim that 
his elements continued incursions into the site after 11 June 2017, the Group sought 
additional clarification from ITRI. During a telephone conversation in June 2017, 
ITRI Ltd told the Group that it was aware of Mando’s continued presence in Kalay  
Boeing but stressed there was no indication that his troops benefited in any way 
from mining operations.  
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 B. Gold  
 
 
99. The Group notes that there has been little progress towards the regulation of 
artisanally sourced gold since its last report (see S/2016/1102, paras. 56-76). In line 
with a recommendation contained in the Group’s last final report, the Governments 
of the United Arab Emirates and Uganda provided information on their efforts to 
stop the sale of gold smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to their 
territories (see annex 41). The Government of Burundi has not yet replied (see 
S/2016/466, para. 241).  
100. A long-awaited gold traceability scheme (Initiative pour la traçabilité de l’or 
artisanal) was publicly launched on 12 June 2017 in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Nevertheless, it is still unclear when the implementation phase will start. 
The Group believes that the system should be further monitored in order to 
determine if it can solve the problems related to the lack of traceability.  
101. The Group is aware of cases involving FARDC elements and other armed 
actors in the exploitation and trade of gold across the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. This was consistent with the Group’s previous findings (see, for example, 
S/2012/843, paras. 132, 133 and 135; S/2014/42, paras. 161-169; and S/2015/19, 
paras. 195-196). In the following subsection the Group presents its findings on the 
involvement of a senior FARDC officer in illegal gold exploitation.  
 
  Major General Gabriel Amisi Kumba  
 
102. The Group documented the involvement of Major General Gabriel Amisi 
Kumba, also known as Tango Four (see S/2012/843, paras. 121-123 and 138), the 
FARDC commander of the first defence zone of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, in the gold sector. The Group notes that article 27 of the 2002 mining code 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo excluded FARDC officers from any 
involvement in the exploitation and trade of natural resources.  
103. In December 2016, a mining agent based in the town of Bafwasende, Tshopo 
Province, told the Group that when he was in Bomili to collect taxes from gold 
operators, two dredge operators refused to pay any State tax, arguing that Major 
General Amisi owned their dredges. In January 2017, during a visit to Bomili, four 
dredge owners and two miners working on the Awimi River told the Group that 
Major General Amisi owned four dredges through a local company called La 
Conquête. Two State mining agents in Kisangani and Bafwasende, as well as one 
civil society actor, also informed the Group that Major General Amisi owned 
dredges on the Awimi River in the city of Bomili, Bafwasende Territory. 7  
104. During the period under review, the Group collected testimony that La 
Conquête’s management enjoyed instances of FARDC protection, for example in 
May and June 2016, as confirmed by Bomili-based sources. Several sources told the 
Group that gold from Major General Amisi’s dredges was sent mainly to Kisangani.  
105. Four dredge owners told the Group that gold production was low in January 
2017 on the Awimi River compared to previous months, but still averaged 50 g daily 
per dredge. Two months earlier, in November 2016, the production was around 
100 g daily per dredge.8 The same sources told the Group they experienced periods 
when the production was as high as 500 g daily for each dredge operating on the 
__________________ 
 
7  The Group has previously reported on the dredging activity in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (see S/2015/19, paras. 192-194 and 225 (a); S/2015/797, paras. 68-73; and S/2016/1102, 
para. 69).  
 
8  Gold is traded in Bomili at $40/g, in Kisangani at $42 -$45/g and in Butembo at $45-$50/g.  
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Awimi River. The Group sought to clarify these findings with Major General Amisi 
but could not reach him at the time of writing. 
 
  Patterns of gold smuggling  
 
106. As previously reported (see S/2014/42, para. 171), the Group confirmed that 
almost all artisanally sourced gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was 
exported illegally and underestimated in both value and volume (see, for example, 
S/2016/466, para. 123). In 2016, the country officially exported 244.42 kg of gold 
according to the Commission interministérielle d’harmonisation et de consolidation 
des statistiques. The Group believes that these statistics underrepresent the actual 
volume of exports.  
107. Exports declared by comptoirs do not reflect the reality of the market. For 
example in Butembo, the sole comptoir, Glory minerals, Glorym (see S/2016/466, 
paras. 140-144), declared less than 7 kg of gold exports in 2016. This contradicts 
information the Group obtained during its investigations. For instance, traders 
working at gold mining sites in North Kivu and Tshopo provinces told the Group 
that most of their production was sold in Butembo. Among others, the associates of 
Glorym continued to illegally export the largest part of the gold they purchased. 
Several people implicated in the gold trade in Bukavu and Bunia, two major gold 
trading hubs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, told the Group that similar 
dynamics prevail there.  
108. The Group conducted an investigation on a Congolese national, Ms. Elysée 
Kanini Chibalonza. In October 2016, customs agents in Dubai found 150 kg of 
undeclared gold in her luggage (see annex 42). Ms. Chibalonza was flying from 
Lubumbashi on Ethiopian Airlines.9 The Group recovered records of Chibalonza’s 
travels between Lubumbashi and Dubai from January 2015 to January 2017, 
confirming that she travelled at least once a month on this route (see annex 43). The 
Group visited Lubumbashi in February 2017 in order to investigate whether 
Ms. Chibalonza was affiliated with any comptoir, since these are the only entities 
allowed to acquire licences for gold export. Mining authorities told the Group that 
throughout 2016 Romineral Congo SARL was the only registered comptoir to have 
officially exported gold from Lubumbashi to Dubai, on three occasions in  total. In 
May 2017, during a telephone conversation with the Group, Romineral’s manager 
denied any affiliation with Ms. Chibalonza.  
109. The Group believes Ms. Chibalonza to be a smuggler. It is unclear where the 
gold she exported from Lubumbashi was obtained. However, the Group’s 
investigation cannot exclude that some of the gold traded in Lubumbashi originated 
from high-risk or conflict-affected areas in provinces such as South Kivu, Kasai or 
Tanganyika. In the absence of information from the Government of the United Arab 
Emirates, the Group is unable to estimate the total volume of gold Ms. Chibalonza 
could have carried to Dubai. To illustrate the magnitude of the issue, if 
Ms. Chibalonza had carried 150 kg of gold on each of her trips, she, alone, could 
potentially have smuggled up to 3.6 tons throughout the last two years. This is not 
an isolated case and highlights weaknesses in the control of hand luggage by 
airlines (see paras. 110-112) as well as recipient and transit countries (see 
paras. 118-125).  
 
__________________ 
 
9  Gold with a volume of a litre weighs roughly less than 20 kg. Standard size measures adopted by 
most commercial airlines suggest that a piece of hand luggage usually has a volume of around 
15 litres. Hence, a passenger could theoretically travel with up to 300 kg of gold in a single 
carry-on bag.  
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  Commercial airlines  
 
110. Airlines play an important role in enabling the transport of unwrought gold 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Dubai. For example, four people 
involved in the gold sector told the Group that it was common practice for 
smugglers to purchase additional, empty seats in order to maximize the amount of 
gold smuggled on one single trip.  
111. The Group requested information from the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), Ethiopian Airlines and Kenya Airways, two airlines connecting 
Lubumbashi with Dubai, to know whether they had adopted specific measures to 
tackle the problem related to hand-carry gold. In a response to the Group’s request 
dated April 2017, IATA clarified that it had not issued an instruction or mandated 
standards for its members. In June 2017, Ethiopian Airlines responded that while 
they had a procedure for securing and protecting valuable items from theft, they had 
no procedure to perform origin checks for transported gold and to authenticate the 
identity of carriers. In July 2017, Kenya Airways told the Group that the company 
does not allow transportation of gold either as checked or as hand luggage on the 
aircraft.  
112. On the basis of the replies from IATA and Ethiopian Airlines, the Group 
understands that it is the responsibility of customs at the airport of departure to 
check the luggage and ensure that passengers have the required documents for gold 
export before boarding a flight. However, the Group’s investigations suggest that 
customs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and neighbouring countries, from 
where smugglers are boarding or transiting to Dubai, do not play their role. Several 
sources, including customs agents and people involved in the gold sector, told the 
Group that smugglers bribe State agents at Entebbe, Nairobi and Lubumbashi 
airports to pass unhindered through controls.  
 
  Congolese International Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates  
 
113. In June 2016, 50 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
certificates to ensure the traceability of minerals disappeared from the Centre 
d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification (CEEC), the official agency issuing such 
certificates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group confirmed the 
illegal use of at least two of those certificates.  
114. CEEC investigated the disappearance of the 50 certificates (see annex 44). Its 
inquiry was prompted in June 2016 after Belgian authorities refused to clear the 
export/import of a gold parcel associated to International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region certificate number CD00007976. The Group has requested further 
information from the Government of Belgium and is awaiting a response.  
115. In February 2017, three Congolese mining agents told the Group that a second 
missing certificate, number CD00001892, was used in Lubumbashi to export 
99.5 kg of gold to Dubai via Nairobi on a Kenya Airways flight. After receiving this 
information, the Group requested additional details from the Government of Kenya 
and has not yet received a reply. The Group also shared this information with the 
Government of the United Arab Emirates for further investigations.  
116. The Group is not aware whether the internal investigation by CEEC identified 
the person(s) responsible for the disappearance of the certificates given that no one 
has been held accountable to date. Furthermore, the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo has not yet replied to the Group’s request for further 
information about its efforts to address this issue with the International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region secretariat, as well as destination countries.  
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117. The Group notes with great concern that, beyond these two cases, further 
certificates could be used to smuggle gold or other minerals, including those 
sourced from mining sites under the control of armed actors. While the latter 
violates paragraph 7 (g) of Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), the Group 
emphasizes that the misuse of certificates also facilitates the generation of illicit 
financial flows and enables money-laundering.  
 
  The role of foreign countries  
 
118. Beyond its investigations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group 
also notes that events in transit as well as destination countries for Congolese gold 
remain paramount to the dynamics of illegal exploitation and trade. Below, the 
Group focuses its observation on two examples.  
 
  Uganda  
 
119. The Group had previously reported that Kampala-based gold traders were 
buying gold smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2014/42, 
paras. 182-188; and S/2015/19, paras. 199-201). During the period under review, the 
Group received testimony from several sources based in Bunia, Butembo and 
Kampala, all of which are involved in gold trading. They confirmed previously 
reported patterns of smuggling. In the course of its investigations, the Group 
received names of individuals and companies that illegally buy gold exported from 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Given that it has not yet been possible to 
confirm all of these cases according to its evidentiary standards, the Group believes 
this should be further investigated.  
120. The Group interviewed eight people involved in the gold sector in Bunia, three 
of whom were also active in Butembo. They informed the Group that they still had 
business relations with the directors of the sanctioned entities United Commercial 
Impex (UCI; CDe.009) and Machanga Ltd (CDe.007). In Kampala, the Group also 
met with a civil society actor and three Congolese nationals who served as 
intermediaries between Kampala-based gold traders and those in Butembo and 
Bunia. The three intermediaries confirmed that the Director of Machanga Ltd was 
still a regular buyer of gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The same 
sources also mentioned Sameer Bhimji (see S/2015/19, para. 207), stating that he 
competed over the same Congolese gold suppliers with Machanga Ltd. The Group is 
aware that, in December 2016, the Uganda Revenue Authority confiscated 
undocumented gold in Bhimji’s house.  
121. While the Group was not able to meet with the Director of Machanga Ltd in 
Kampala, it met on three occasions with the directors of UCI. The latter stated that 
following their listing they had not been involved in the gold sector. In addition, 
they expressed their wish to be delisted in order to resume operations and comply 
with international standards.  
122. The major development in Kampala’s gold market was the resurgence of legal 
exports from Uganda. The Group had previously documented the decline in offi cial 
gold exports from Uganda after 2007, when sanctions were placed upon Machanga 
and UCI (see S/2014/42, paras. 182-188 and annex 71). According to online 
statistics from the Bank of Uganda, Uganda’s official gold exports had increased 
from 11 kg in 2014 to 1,118 kg in 2015, and to 8,751 kg, the highest ever recorded, 
in 2016. From January to April 2017, Uganda officially exported 2,938 kg, which 
puts it on a pace to beat the 2016 record. Additional data from 2016, published by 
the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, confirmed previous findings regarding the 
country’s limited own gold production, facts also confirmed in the Government of 
Uganda’s letter to the Group in June 2017 (see annex 45). According to the 
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Government of Uganda, the discrepancy between export and production values 
results from undocumented domestic gold production. However, the Group believes 
that Uganda remained a transit hub for gold produced in other countries, such as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
123. The revival of official gold exports from Uganda coincides with the 2016 
opening of the country’s first gold refinery, African Gold Refinery (AGR) owned by 
Alain Goetz (see S/2009/603, paras. 130 and 154-157). AGR senior management 
told the Group that they were expecting to export more than 10 tons of gold in 2017. 
This suggests that gold exports from Uganda had always been largely 
underreported. When the Government of Uganda provided statistics  to the Group in 
2014, official exports were less than 15 kg (see S/2015/19, para. 199), in line with 
the aforementioned Bureau of Statistics data. For the same year, the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) published exports of one ton. 
The Group therefore believes that AGR could contribute to a cleaner gold trade in 
Uganda.  
124. During a meeting in May and subsequently in a letter in June 2017, AGR told 
the Group that the company to date “does not have the capacity to map the actual 
physical flow of each and every gram of gold”. AGR senior management told the 
Group that there was a need for additional, internationally agreed procedures to 
fulfil this requirement. However, while the Group is not aware of any illegal activity 
of AGR to date, it believes that it is highly possible that gold smuggled from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo could occasionally permeate the company’s 
supply chain.  
125. The Group requested a list of AGR suppliers but has not received it and takes 
note of the willingness of AGR to first require “proper consent” of their suppliers. 
This information would help to ascertain if certain suppliers were involved in 
fraudulent trade with smugglers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 
Group saw a copy of an agreement signed by AGR and CEEC, in which the two 
parties acknowledged that gold was smuggled from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to Uganda. Furthermore, it includes a commitment to work closely in  the 
fight against smuggling according to international and International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region regulations.  
126. Following several requests, the Group met with officials of the Government of 
Uganda in March 2017. During the meeting in Kampala, the latter did not deny the 
smuggling of gold from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Uganda but 
attributed it mainly to the porosity of the borders. The Ugandan officials committed 
to sharing, with the Group, the results of their investigation into Kampala-based 
gold traders initiated in 2014 (see S/2015/19, para. 203).  
 
  United Arab Emirates  
 
127. Dubai is the main recipient of artisanally sourced unwrought gold from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group was able to confirm that Congolese 
gold arriving there is mainly exported fraudulently; this is consistent with the 
Group’s previous findings (see S/2005/30, para. 119; S/2007/423, paras. 124-126; 
S/2008/773, para. 93; S/2015/19, para. 210; and S/2016/466, para. 166).  
128. Several exporters and intermediaries implicated in the gold trade in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda told the Group that they regularly 
travelled with known smugglers to Dubai in order to sell gold. When the Group met 
with the Government of the United Arab Emirates in April 2017, the latter expressed 
willingness to assist the Group’s investigations on the above -mentioned smugglers 
in Dubai. Consequently, the Group provided the Government of the United Arab 
Emirates with the names of smugglers it had collected, for instance that of 
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Ms. Chibalonza (see paras. 108-109), and believes that they should be further 
investigated.  
129. In another case, the Group had previously given the name of Nilesh Subash 
Lodhia to the Government of the United Arab Emirates (see S/2009/603, 
para. 136).10 Mr. Lodhia, the owner and sole employee of Rafiki General Trading, is 
also a former employee of UCI, a sanctioned entity. The Group documented that 
Rafiki General Trading was the sole buyer of gold from the Butembo -based 
comptoir Glorym during the period under review. The Group sought to meet 
Mr. Lodhia to inquire about the link between his gold trade and the stated activities 
of Rafiki General Trading (see annex 46). When the Group asked to talk to 
Mr. Lodhia, the Government of the United Arab Emirates informed the Group that it 
had already shut down Rafiki General Trading.  
130. The Group welcomes the initiatives taken by the Government of the United 
Arab Emirates to meet the recommendation set out in its last final report (see 
S/2016/466, para. 241; and annex 47 to the present report). The Group believes, 
however, that they can only yield lasting results if fully implemented.  
131. Nonetheless, the easy access for gold smugglers in Dubai’s market is the 
consequence of the loopholes in the United Arab Emirates control system and 
legislation for hand-carry gold as documented previously (see S/2015/19, para. 210; 
and S/2016/466, para. 166). It is the Group’s understanding that United Arab 
Emirates law does not consider smuggling activity to be a crime. Therefore, the 
customs authorities, most of the time, apply only trafficking fines. In April 2017, the 
Group visited the gold souk of Dubai’s Deira district and found that the patterns 
described in previous reports still exist.  
132. Based on its interviews with senior officials in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region secretariat, and 
in the United Arab Emirates and Uganda during the period under review, the Group 
understands that the efforts of these stakeholders could be improved to enhance the 
fight against gold smuggling. As previously reported (see S/2016/466, annex 53), 
regular collaboration between the aforementioned parties could significantly reduce 
such smuggling. The Group believes that the United Arab Emirates increased 
awareness of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region member State 
regulations for gold export would be a positive development. It could facilitate, 
among others, a system of authentication of the documents required for gold exports 
from those countries upon arrival in Dubai.  
 
 
 C. Charcoal  
 
 
133. The Group’s investigations showed that one of the most stable sources of 
income generation for FDLR remained the illegal taxation of charcoal produced and 
sold by local populations, as well as the sale of their own production (see 
S/2015/19, paras. 74-78; S/2015/797, paras. 33-34; and S/2016/466, paras. 26-27). 
The Group gathered consistent information that FARDC also benefited from 
charcoal produced in the aforementioned areas inside the Virunga National Park, 
levying taxes of CGF 1,700 per bag sold in Kitchanga and CGF 1,000 per bag 
loaded in Kabalekasha.  
134. The Group observed that in one of the two supply chains investigated, centred 
on the areas of Bishusha and Kitchanga on the south-western margin of the Virunga 
National Park, charcoal production continues relatively unabated. The other supply 
__________________ 
 
10  Nilesh S. Lodhia has no family ties to Jamnadas V. Lodhia, also known as Chuni, one of the 
directors of UCI.  
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chain, however, centred on the areas of Tongo and Mulimbi, was severely disrupted 
by a combination of controls by the Institut congolais pour la conservation de la 
nature (ICCN) and FARDC military manoeuvres against FDLR.  
135. It is of note that charcoal remained a key source of subsistence for local 
populations. However, the Group’s investigations confirmed that there was no 
international market for charcoal produced in the Virunga National Park.  
 
  Charcoal production and taxation by FDLR in Rutshuru territory  
 
136. The Group investigated a cluster of three camps in the south-west of the 
Virunga National Park (10 km south of Bishusha) where 1,000 families unaffiliated 
to FDLR produced charcoal. Each family produced on average a kiln a week (1,000 
kilns for the three sites), on which they have to pay taxes of CGF 6,500 per kiln to 
FDLR (see annex 48).11 Further to this taxation, the above-mentioned sources told 
the Group that FDLR also produced some 450 bags of charcoal per week for direct 
sale.  
137. In a second case, around Bishusha and Bwiza, the charcoal produced by some 
500 families unaffiliated to FDLR amounted to 500 kilns per week: local producers 
had to pay a tax of CGF 4,000 per kiln of charcoal produced and an in-kind tax 
corresponding to one day of work to FDLR. Charcoal produced in these areas 
transited through the village of Kahe, where many traders from Kitchanga 
purchased it. According to some of them and Kahe residents, some 800 to 1,000  
bags of charcoal used to transit through Kahe every day.  
138. The Group notes that, while FDLR taxation occurs at the production level, 
FARDC elements also generate revenues by levying taxes on charcoal sold in 
Kitchanga and Kabalekasha.  
139. Ceteris paribus, FDLR could generate up to CGF 8.5 million ($6,000) each 
week from illegal taxes on the production and CGF 12 -15 million ($8,500-$10,700) 
from taxes on the sales of charcoal produced in all the aforementioned areas.  
140. On the same assumptions, FARDC could in turn levy CGF 18.6-23 million 
($13,200-$16,400) from the taxation of charcoal sold in Kitchanga and 
CGF 13-16 million ($9,300-$11,400) in Kabalekasha.  
 
  Drop of charcoal production and taxation in Tongo area  
 
141. Around Tongo and Mulimbi, the Group observed a meltdown of charcoal 
production in FDLR-controlled areas from about 1,000 kilns to almost nil by early 
2017. According to customary authorities in Tongo and Mulimbi as well as charcoal 
traders interviewed in Mulimbi, this sharp drop was due to the combined effect of 
FARDC military manoeuvres against FDLR and to ICCN establishing fixed 
checkpoints in Tongo and Kalengera to stop the transport of charcoal from the 
Virunga National Park.  
142. The above-mentioned sources reported that, by the end of 2016, the FDLR 
officers responsible for charcoal production, taxation and sales in the area started to 
be concerned about the possibility of locals being informants for FARDC and 
limited the access to the Virunga National Park, including for charcoal-making 
purposes. As a consequence, most families resorted to producing legal charcoal 
__________________ 
 
11  Each kiln of charcoal, locally called four, burns on average five cubic feet of timber (equivalent 
to three adult trees), which yields on average 1.1 cubic metres of charcoal (equivalent to 8-10 
bags) after a week of pyrolysis.  
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from eucalyptus trees outside the Park and beyond FDLR control. 12 Conversely, 
FDLR around Tongo began to compensate the loss in charcoal revenue by imposing 
in-kind taxes on other goods as well as protection rackets.  
 
 
 IV. Arms  
 
 
143. The Group investigated three potential cases of violations of the arms 
embargo, including one heavy weapon recovered from FDLR; an incursion of FDN 
into the Democratic Republic of the Congo; as well as a network of arms traffickers 
operating across the Ruzizi River between Burundi and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The Group notes that arms transfers in violation of the embargo occurred 
both domestically and across borders. In addition, the Group reports on efforts to 
trace arms and ammunition recovered from armed groups and the related lack of 
cooperation on the side of potential countries of origin and end users.  
 
 
 A. Violations of the arms embargo  
 
 
144. In line with its mandate, the Group investigated a missile recovered from 
FDLR. The Group also investigated an incursion of the Burundian army into 
Congolese territory and a network of illegal arms trade in Uvira territory, South 
Kivu Province.  
 
  SAM-16 recovered from FDLR  
 
145. In August 2016, FARDC recovered a missile system referred to as a man -
portable air defence system from FDLR. The model in question, a SAM -16 Gimlet 
or 9K310 Igla-1, was found in a former FDLR headquarters near Mibirubiru, 10 km 
west of the town of Nyanzale in North Kivu Province (see annex 49).  
146. Some components of the missile system, including the battery, the grip stock 
as well as the power supply system, were missing. It was produced in 1987. The 
Group saw that the materiel had characteristics similar to missiles produced in the 
former Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). The Group believes that such 
materiel in the hands of an armed group represents a significant threat to the 
population and, if properly fitted, to aircraft as well.  
147. The Group had previously reported that FDLR possessed such materiel and 
that, in 1998, the Armée pour la libération du Rwanda, the de facto FDLR 
predecessor, captured it from the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie -
Goma at Mount Goma during a clash (see S/2010/596, para. 94). Three FARDC 
sources and former senior FDLR leaders independently confirmed this to the Group. 
The Group began to trace the materiel in order to determine  and confirm the 
producing countries as well as the original end users of the weapon in question.  
 
  Kiliba Ondes attack  
 
148. On 21 December 2016, FDN entered Congolese territory near Kiliba Ondes, a 
village north of the Uvira-Bujumbura road. The Group is aware that FDN regularly 
crosses the border in order to carry out joint patrols with FARDC. In this case, the 
Group was not aware of any notification to the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) by the Government of Burundi about 
__________________ 
 
12  Charcoal produced from eucalyptus is much less efficient than from the tree species found inside 
the Virunga National Park, and thus sold at a lower price (CFG 5,000-6,000 per bag at wholesale 
trading hubs, where charcoal from the Park would be sold at CFG 13,000 per bag). For this 
reason eucalyptus charcoal is known locally as makala biwerewere (“idiots’ charcoal”).  
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the entry of FDN elements into Congolese territory with arms. The Group can 
confirm that this event led to fighting between FARDC and FDN around Kiliba 
Ondes.  
149. Five eyewitnesses told the Group that they saw FDN soldiers entering the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo near the Vugizo border post around 7 a.m. 
Shortly after progressing towards Kiliba sector 6, FDN opened fire. While some 
witnesses reported that FDN might have intended to attack FNL-Nzabampema 
combatants, the nearby FARDC battalion retaliated as they experienced FDN fire. 
The belligerents came into direct contact near the sugar factory in Kiliba Ondes. 
Officers of FARDC, the Congolese national police and the Direction générale des 
migrations confirmed the event with the Group. Witnesses continued to hear gunfire 
exchange until 3 p.m. (see annex 50).  
150. During the incident, one farmer and one FARDC soldier were wounded. While 
accounts of the number of victims are diverse, close to 10 witnesses agree that a 
minimum of three FDN soldiers were killed and subsequently brought to the morgue 
of the general hospital in Uvira.  
 
  Arms traffic across the Ruzizi River  
 
151. The Ruzizi Plain and Lake Tanganyika continue to be hotbeds of armed 
mobilization and arms trading. The Group found at least three Burundian armed 
groups operating in these areas (FOREBU, RED -Tabara and FNL-Nzabampema; see 
paras. 45-50), embedded in complex relationships with local armed groups such as 
the Mai Mai and local defence groups.  
152. The Group investigated one network of arms traffickers involving members of 
the Burundian army, various middlemen and Congolese armed groups (see 
annex 51). One of the key actors of this network was a Burundian named Manassé 
Hakizimana who was killed in March 2017. Eyewitnesses told the Group that on a 
monthly basis Manassé Hakizimana would go to the Ruzizi River that separates the 
two countries to take delivery of arms and ammunition shipments. On the Burundian 
side, FDN elements would arrive at night to deliver the arms. The Group requested 
further details from the Government of Burundi and is awaiting a reply.  
153. Sources told the Group that an individual known as “Jadot”, a former member 
of Mai Mai Kayamba, would accompany the FDN elements. Two sources involved 
in the transportation of the materiel, and several civil society sources told the Group 
that, once an arms shipment was ready at the shores, local fishermen would 
transport it across the river. Usually, a shipment would contain small quantities to 
circumvent control, as in three instances brought to the attention of the Group. 
While the Group was not able to document the transfers in situ, witnesses reported 
one transfer of 10 guns and six boxes of ammunition in Katogota, one transfer of 
15 AK-47-pattern rifles and a bag of ammunition in Luberizi and one transfer of 
two light machine guns, two grenade launchers, two pistols, five AK -47-pattern 
rifles and several boxes of ammunition in Sange.  
154. Upon arrival in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, designated motorbike 
drivers would pick up the shipments to deliver them. This was scheduled according 
to timings and locations previously agreed between involved officers, middlemen, 
fishermen, transporters and armed groups. In many cases, the delivery route passed 
near Katogota, next to the Mobutu Bridge. Among those that received supplies 
through this network were Mai Mai Mwenyemali, Mai Mai Bigaya, Mai Mai 
Nyerere and Mai Mai Karakara. Sources told the Group that the rationale behind 
these transfers was to counter security threats to the Government of Burundi posed 
by groups such as RED-Tabara and FOREBU, by way of supporting Congolese 
armed groups that the Burundians anticipated could eventually serve as proxies.  
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 B. Tracing efforts  
 
 
155. During the period under review, the Group’s investigations on arms and 
ammunition recovered from armed groups formerly and currently operating on 
Congolese territory were slowed by certain factors. This was principally the result 
of the lack of responses to the Group’s queries regarding certain countries of origin 
and certain end users, as well as the lack of cooperation on the side of the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
156. With a view to tracing the origin of the recovered arms and ammunition as 
previously reported (see S/2016/1102, para. 113), the Group had requested further 
information from potential countries of origin. The arms and ammunition had 
characteristics similar to those produced in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic (former 
Czechoslovakia), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Greece, Israel, China, 
Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation (former USSR), the Sudan and 
Uganda.13  
157. The Group appreciates the responses received from Bulgaria, Israel, the 
Russian Federation and Uganda. Israel and Uganda requested further details in order 
to confirm the initial end users, for example serial numbers on the original 
packages, in order to assist the Group in its tracing efforts. The Group notes that 
ammunition recovered from armed groups was rarely found in the original 
packages. The Government of Bulgaria also informed the Group that records on 
arms sales were kept only for a period of 10 years.  
158. FARDC officers confirmed to the Group that most of the arms and ammunition 
documented might have been transferred from national stocks to the respective 
armed groups they were found with. The Group received consistent testimony that 
diversions from national stocks continued to be the main source of supply for armed 
groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is in line with its previous 
findings (see S/2009/603, paras. 23-29 and 40-43; S/2015/797, para. 46; 
S/2016/466, para. 229; and S/2016/1102, para. 113).  
159. The Group has observed that across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
local variation notwithstanding, AK-47-pattern rifles could usually be purchased for 
as little as $30-$40 and light machine guns for around $200-$250. Several sources 
confirm these observations, including that ammunition could also be purchased 
from as little as CGF 200 per round (see para. 21).  
160. The Group collected bullet casings spent during Mai Mai Kilalo’s attack on 
MONUSCO and the Congolese national police in Butembo in December 2016 and 
analysed them. According to its investigations and senior FARDC officers, the 
bullets used by the Mai Mai combatants during the attack have head stamps similar 
to those found in national stocks (see annex 52).  
161. In January 2017, during a mission to Ituri, the Group documented ammunition 
with the head stamp “LI-02”, manufactured by the Ugandan Luwero Industries Ltd 
in 2002. The ammunition in question had been recovered from the Forces de 
résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI) (see S/2012/348, paras. 51-52; and annex 53 
to the present report). The Group asked the Government of Uganda about potential 
end users. In its response, the Government of Uganda clarified that the ammunition 
is for local use only. While the Group continues to investigate how FRPI obtained 
the ammunition, it notes the high likelihood of this representing a violation of the 
arms embargo.  
__________________ 
 
13  The Group has often relied on information provided by Member States that are either countries 
of origin or end users as well as the markings on the weapons and head stamps of ammunition in 
its attempts to trace them.  
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162. Several countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have not 
responded to the Group’s requests for assistance in the tracing of arms and 
ammunition during the period of reporting. In the course of two meetings in October 
2016 and February 2017, the Head of the National Commission for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons committed to providing updated statistics on the 
efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to mark 
weapons and manage the stockpile of its security forces. The Group has not received 
the information at the time of writing.  
163. In October 2016, the Group also visited the Congolese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation. During the meeting, a senior official of the 
Ministry committed to setting up a committee with focal points to respond to the 
Group’s requests for information. The Group has not yet received an update 
regarding their nomination.  
 
 
 V. Violations of international humanitarian law  
 
 
164. During the period of reporting, the Group observed that violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights continued to be at significant 
levels in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group focused on violations 
such as the murder of two of its members on 12 March 2017 in Kasai Central 
Province, cases of child rape in South Kivu Province and an at tack on MONUSCO 
in North Kivu Province.  
 
 
 A. Murder of two members of the Group of Experts  
 
 
165. On 12 March 2017, the Group’s Coordinator and armed groups expert, 
Michael Sharp, and the humanitarian expert, Zaida Catalán, were assassinated in a 
premeditated setup under hitherto unclear circumstances. The Group wishes to 
stress that killing members of the Group of Experts represents an attack on the 
Security Council, which is a serious violation of international humanitarian law.  
 
  Escalation of violence in greater Kasai  
 
166. The previously stable greater Kasai region in the south -central Democratic 
Republic of the Congo has seen an escalation of violence and alarming levels of 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights since August 2016, 
when FARDC troops killed Jean-Pierre Mpandi Prince, customary chief of the 
Kamuina Nsapu clan and erstwhile leader of an homonymous insurgency. Kamuina 
Nsapu’s violent reaction to Mpandi’s killing, including attacks against State agents 
and symbols, prompted FARDC and the national police to launch offensives against 
the insurgent movement, often using disproportionate violence. Following that, 
dozens of mass graves and video footage showing deliberate killings, including of 
unarmed Kamuina Nsapu elements, have been documented.  
167. Throughout 2017, this conflict moved away from an insurrection of a specific 
community towards a larger upheaval spreading the “Kamuina Nsapu” label far 
beyond its initial confines. Sources told the Group that, while many factions were 
hostile to the Government, pro-Government militias have also emerged operating 
under the Kamuina Nsapu label. At the time of writing, the ensuing violence has 
engulfed vast parts of Kasai, Kasai Central, Kasai Oriental and Haut -Lomami 
provinces.  
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  Assassination of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán  
 
168. Considering the level of human rights violations and potentially sanctionable 
offences, the Group began its investigations on the greater Kasai region. Two 
members of the Group, Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán, visited Kananga in 
January 2017 to begin field investigations. Some of their prel iminary results are 
reflected in the preceding paragraphs. Early in March, they returned to Kananga in 
order to finalize the ongoing investigations.  
169. The Group retrieved an audiotape dated 11 March 2017, in which the two 
experts had a discussion with representatives of the Kamuina Nsapu family. Parts of 
the discussion concerned a field visit scheduled for the following day. The tape 
confirmed that the investigation aimed at better understanding Kamuina Nsapu’s 
structure, its support networks and the potential recruitment and use of children.  
170. On 12 March 2017, they embarked on a field visit from Kananga towards the 
locality of Bunkonde. The Group understands that, around 4 p.m. local time, 
Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán were executed by a heterocl ite group of 
individuals not yet identified at the time of writing.  
 
  Ongoing investigations into the murder  
 
171. The Group conducted preliminary analyses of telephone records and a video of 
the murder, as well as interviews. The preliminary evidence does not yet allow the 
Group to attribute responsibility for the murder. However, the available evidence 
does not preclude the involvement of different actors such as (pro - or 
anti-Government) Kamuina Nsapu factions, other armed groups and members of 
State security services.  
172. The Group is aware that the Congolese military justice, the Polismyndigheten 
(Swedish Police Authority) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United 
States are conducting criminal investigations into the murder of the two experts. 
The Group appreciates the appointment of a Board of Inquiry by the United Nations 
Secretary-General. It is the Group’s understanding that this Board can gather 
information that could contribute to the ongoing criminal investigations.  
173. The Group notes that the military justice arrested certain suspects, two of 
whom are standing trial at the time of writing. However, the Group notes that other 
key suspects of the murder have not yet been arrested despite available evidence. In 
May 2017, the Group spoke to a senior police officer who denounced the lack of 
cooperation on the side of the Government security services involved in the 
investigations. In addition, the repeated diffusion by the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo of a tape featuring the murder of the two experts 
could obstruct ongoing criminal investigations.  
 
 
 B. Child rape in the Kavumu area  
 
 
174. Between 2013 and 2016, the Panzi Hospital in Bukavu treated 42 cases of 
aggravated rape, leading to traumatic fistulae, of children and girls aged 1-16 in and 
around Kavumu, South Kivu Province. The Group found that a militia called Jeshi 
La Yesu (“Army of Jesus”) carried out the rapes. Led by Frédéric Batumike 
Rugimbanja, at that time a member of the South Kivu provincial assembly, this 
militia is made up of former Raia Mutomboki and Mai Mai elements, national 
police elements and former workers from the Bishibirhu plantation.  
175. Two militiamen and other sources told the Group that Jeshi La Yesu 
perpetrated child rapes as part of a ritual believed to render their combatants 
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impervious to bullets. The militiamen also confirmed their group’s rituals were led 
by a person called “Kabuchungu” or “Kabotchonga”. In June 2016, this person, 
together with Batumike and several members of the militia, were arre sted on 
charges including rape of children and young girls.  
176. The above-mentioned sources told the Group that the militia has engaged in 
targeted killings of critics since at least 2012.14 This is consistent with testimonies 
collected from civilians who told the Group that they received death threats from 
Jeshi La Yesu members.  
 
 
 C. Attack on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Butembo  
 
 
177. On the basis of the testimony of former combatants — including some 
involved in the attack — the Group established that Mai Mai Kilalo attacked 
Butembo on 19 December 2016. Under the operational command of “Colonel” 
Kakule Kitelemire and his deputy known as “Kanyere”, around 80 elements were 
involved in the operation. They arrived in Butembo around 5 a.m. and targeted 
MONUSCO premises, the national police office next to them and Kakwangura 
prison in Butembo. Ex-combatants told the Group that the purpose of the attack was 
to free some of their elements. Another aim was to liberate Baraka Lolwako 
Mumbere, the former leader of Mai Mai Corps du Christ, whom they believed to be 
detained at Butembo prison as well. However, the Group documented that the attack 
focused mainly on MONUSCO and the Congolese national police.  
178. While the attack demonstrated firepower beyond that of most armed groups 
operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, combatants told the 
Group that only a minority of them had firearms. Based on testimony from South 
African peacekeepers and national police officers involved in the half-hour fighting 
and the Group’s investigation, Mai Mai Kilalo fired over 1,000 rounds from AK -47-
pattern rifles and at least one light machine gun. The Group’s initial analysis of the 
bullet casings left behind does not suggest outside supply; all of the ammunition 
codes can also be found in national police or FARDC stocks (see annex 52). An 
attacker killed during the fighting was wearing a scarf with “UPLC”, Mai  Mai 
Kilalo’s acronym, written on it.  
179. One South African peacekeeper, one FARDC soldier, one policeman, one 
civilian and nine Mai Mai Kilalo combatants were killed during the fighting. The 
Group notes that attacks on civilians and peacekeepers are violations of 
international humanitarian law and sanctionable acts.  
 
 
 VI.  Recommendations  
 
 
180. The Group makes the recommendations set out below.  
 
  Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 
181. The Group recommends that the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo:  
 (a)  Revise the implementation of its current disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration programme with a focus on the aspect of reintegration, in 
__________________ 
 
14  Including Jean Bosco Kakonyi and a former member of the milit ia in 2013, as well as human 
rights activist Evariste Kasali Mbogo (who reported on Jeshi La Yesu in 25 February 2016 and 
was killed two months later) and the grouping chief of Bugorhe/Kavumu.   
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particular professional training and job creation, in order to avoid the 
re-mobilization of ex-combatants (see paras. 68-70);  
 (b)  Commence investigations on and, as appropriate, prosecute individuals 
engaged in illegal gold exploitation and trade, in particular Major General Gabriel 
Amisi Kumba, as well as those involved in the disappearance of International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region certificates issued by the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (see paras. 102-105 and 113-117);  
 (c)  Put in place a national legal framework on sanctions implementation, 
including specific provisions for banks and financial institutions operating in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo to freeze the assets of designated individuals and 
entities (see para. 8);  
 (d)  Develop means to overcome identified loopholes in the implementation 
of due diligence, in particular through a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption as 
well as empowering field staff of the Service d’assistance et d’encadrement du 
small-scale mining (SAESSCAM) (see paras. 77-98).  
 
  Security Council  
 
182. The Group recommends that the Security Council:  
 (a)  Mandate the Secretary-General to establish an independent international 
investigation into the murder of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalán to gather 
evidence to identify the perpetrators, their support networks, and motives (see 
paras. 165-173);  
 (b)  Revise Security Council resolution 2360 (2017) extending the mandate 
of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) with a view to:  
 (i) Amending the provisions of paragraph 7 (g) of Security Council 
resolution 2293 (2016) to read “supporting individuals or entities, including 
armed groups or criminal networks associated with illicit  financial flows and 
money-laundering, involved …”, in order to further qualify the notion of 
“criminal networks” already contained therein (see para. 73);  
 (ii)  Mandating the Group of Experts to work with other stakeholders, such as 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the 
International Air Transport Association, to produce recommendations for 
guidelines to streamline and enhance the control of unwrought gold 
transported in carry-on luggage (see paras. 110-112);  
 (iii)  Extending the mandate of the Group of Experts until 30 December 2018 
(see para. 10).  
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